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Abstract
Work throughout the history and philosophy of biology frequently employs ‘chance’, ‘unpredictability’, ‘probability’, and many
similar terms. One common way of understanding how these concepts were introduced in evolution focuses on two central issues:
the first use of statistical methods in evolution (Galton), and the first use of the concept of “objective chance” in evolution (Wright). I
argue that while this approach has merit, it fails to fully capture interesting philosophical reflections on the role of chance expounded
by two of Galton’s students, Karl Pearson and W.F.R. Weldon. Considering a question more familiar from contemporary philosophy
of biology – the relationship between our statistical theories of evolution and the processes in the world those theories describe –
is, I claim, a more fruitful way to approach both these two historical actors and the broader development of chance in evolution.
Keywords: chance, Charles Darwin, evolution, Francis Galton, inheritance, Karl Pearson, natural selection, statistics,
W.F.R. Weldon
1. Introduction
Our discussions of the history and philosophy of evolution-
ary biology continually make use of terms that may broadly
be described as falling under the umbrella of ‘chance’: ‘un-
predictability’, ‘randomness’, ‘stochasticity’, and ‘probability’
provide only a few examples. We find extensive discussion in
the history of biology concerning the introduction of statistical
methods in the life sciences (see, e.g., Sheynin, 1980; Porter,
1986). In the spirit of integrating the history and philosophy of
science, however, it is notable that the corresponding question
about these concepts often goes unanswered. How were the
various notion of ‘chance’ now so prevalent in the biological
literature introduced into evolutionary theorizing?
One of the only serious attempts to describe both facets of
this historical transformation was advanced by Depew and We-
ber (1995), and has since been found in various places through-
out the history and philosophy of biology. Their picture of the
development of chance in evolution seeks to understand two
crucial historical events. First, when and how did evolution-
ary theorizing become statistical? Second, when and how did
such theories come to be taken to describe “genuinely chancy”
processes in the world?1
Elucidating this standard view is the project of my second
section. Francis Galton, it is generally recognized, is respon-
sible for the first, methodological shift – it was Galton’s work
on the statistically derived law of ancestral heredity that intro-
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1The appropriate referent for “genuinely chancy” here is a very difficult
problem, as various concepts of objective chance are often conflated in the (his-
torical and present) literature on evolutionary theory. Thankfully, the point will
not matter substantially for us, as I will not consider how the second question
should be answered.
duced statistics into the study of evolution. The second, concep-
tual shift originates in Sewall Wright’s shifting balance theory,
which required a much more significant role for a chancy pro-
cess of genetic drift than the theories which had come before
it.
After introducing Depew and Weber’s view, we will ex-
plore it in more detail. Section 3 will return to Darwin’s own
works, to establish the now-standard interpretation that Dar-
win believed evolution to be a non-statistical theory of non-
objectively-chancy processes in the world. We then turn to
Francis Galton in section 4, where I describe his role in the
development of the first statistical methods in the study of evo-
lution. Rather than moving on to Wright, however, we will
examine in section 5 two of Galton’s students at the end of the
nineteenth century, Karl Pearson and W.F.R. Weldon. On De-
pew and Weber’s view, these two would be minor characters.
Why, then, consider Pearson and Weldon at all? It is their
work that will serve as our point of departure from considering
the introduction of chance in terms of Depew and Weber’s two
focal historical moments. I will argue that if we are interested
in the emergence of chance in evolution, Pearson and Weldon
should indeed not be read as minor players. A vitally important
distinction can be detected in Weldon and Pearson’s writings on
the philosophical justification for the use of concepts of chance.
Suitably considered, that is, we can see Pearson and Weldon as
innovators not merely in the use of statistical methodology, but
in the philosophical grounding for the use of chance as well. If
we focus only on the two events of the Depew and Weber view,
we will entirely fail to recognize this aspect of their thought.
We must look, then, for a new context for this historical de-
velopment – a new driving question on which we are able to
understand the eventual philosophical rift between Pearson and
Weldon. I will argue that this distinction can be best exposed
by considering the relationship between our statistical theories
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and the processes which those mathematical frameworks are in-
tended to describe.
As regards this new question, then, a more mathematical,
more positivist school of thought, with Pearson at its head, takes
these statistics to be a tool for glossing over the (complex, possi-
bly deterministic or indeterministic) causal details of biological
systems. On the other side, a more empiricist, experimentally
inclined school, with Weldon at its head, takes these statistics
to be an essential way of grasping the full causal detail of bi-
ological systems. We can thus see here, I claim, a dramatic
difference in the understanding of the connection between evo-
lutionary theories and the evolutionary process, positions that
are better comprehended not by way of the “reification” or “ob-
jectification” of chance, but by considering their differing views
on the relationship between evolutionary theory and the bio-
logical world. And this question, as I will briefly argue in the
conclusion, resonates strongly with contemporary work in the
philosophy of biology.
2. Two Focal Events
We will begin, then, by discussing the view of the historical
development of chance laid out in Depew and Weber’s Dar-
winism Evolving (1995) and echoed throughout the subsequent
literature in the history and philosophy of biology.2 The sec-
ond part of their book is devoted to describing the relationship
between the advance of a new variety of Darwinism grounded
in the developing science of genetics and what they call the
“probability revolution” – the same broad historical process that
Hacking called the “taming of chance” (Depew and Weber,
1995, p. 202). While they sometimes refer to this revolution as
a singular event, they also helpfully subdivide it into two parts.
The first is a “statistical revolution,” the introduction of statis-
tics as a tool “for collecting and analyzing quantifiable data,”
initially in the social and then in the scientific realm (Depew
and Weber, 1995, p. 203). Later, with the addition of a robust
probability theory, “the idea arose that probabilities [derived
from these statistics] are based on objective propensities of real
things” (Depew and Weber, 1995, p. 206). These two ingredi-
ents combined to make the probability revolution complete.
We see again, here, the distinction between the introduc-
tion of statistical methods into science and the corresponding
introduction of the philosophical concepts that underlie these
methods. Narrowing our view to the evolutionary realm, we are
led to investigate the two historical events mentioned in the in-
troduction: what was the first time that the statistical revolution
was reflected in evolutionary theory (i.e., the first use of statisti-
cal methods), and what was the first time that probability in the
2Both questions are found, at least, in Hodge (1987) and Morrison (2002).
Galton’s role in the first shift has been discussed by Hacking (1990), as we will
see later. Sheynin (1980) covers the first shift extensively as well. The second
question is explored by Morizot (2012). Philosophically, many works – such
as Brandon and Carson (1996), Millstein (2000), Rosenberg (2001), or Pence
and Ramsey (2013) – implicitly rely on this distinction between the (assumed)
statistical nature of evolutionary theory and the (contested) “chanciness” of bi-
ological processes.
genuine, objective sense was utilized (i.e., the first use of one
particular philosophical conception of chance)?
Depew and Weber go on to describe what have come to
be the standard explanations of these two events. For the first,
they point to the work of Francis Galton. “Galton,” they note,
“contributed less to the continuity of the Darwinian tradition
by his substantive views . . . than his conceptual and method-
ological ones” (Depew and Weber, 1995, p. 201). They make
extensive use of the analysis of Hacking, who persuasively ar-
gued that Galton was the first not just to use a statistical law
for the description of phenomena, but also as “autonomous,”
as a law “serviceable for explanation” of those phenomena by
itself, without having to invoke a large array of supposed (but
unobserved) underlying, small causes (Hacking, 1990, p. 186).
Depew and Weber note that this, as well, is the first time that
statistics is used in a positive manner for the support of Dar-
winian theory, rather than as a way to attack natural selection.3
In the case of the second event – the introduction of an ob-
jective, reified, or “genuine” notion of chance in evolution –
Depew and Weber argue that “Sewall Wright opened up this
Pandora’s box” (1995, p. 287). Wright’s turn toward chance,
they write, was a way of enhancing the ability of the evolution-
ary process to create novelty, to provide “more openings for
creative initiations” (Depew and Weber, 1995, p. 285). Wright,
therefore, completes the probability revolution in the biologi-
cal sciences. While Fisher, they argue, saw chance as merely
a source of mathematical noise, a difficulty in theorizing which
needed to be overcome and factored out, it was Wright who
first argued that evolution invoked genuinely chancy processes
– including random drift, the chanciness of which occasionally
pushed organisms down an adaptive peak and enabled them to
reach a higher neighboring optimum. On this view, we have a
shift toward ‘chance’ precisely because chance is, for the first
time, an active force which can be implicated in certain sorts
of population change (namely, change which runs contrary to
fitness gradients). The interpretation of Wright is, however, fa-
mously quite complicated (Hodge, 1992a, pp. 287–288), and
for our purposes here I will leave the issue underdeveloped. As
we will see, whether or not Wright was indeed the first to use
an objective notion of chance is immaterial to my project.
Before continuing, I should note that by offering a new,
third focus for our historical work on chance in evolution here,
I do not at all intend to disparage either this pair of questions
or the explanations offered for them. Indeed, both mark sig-
nificant and important developments in the history of biology,
ones which we are right to single out for extra scrutiny. I will
argue, however, that if we restrict ourselves to only looking at
the development of chance through these lenses, we run the risk
of missing significant and important developments in the way
that chance was understood by practicing biologists.4 It is this
worry – and the example of the philosophical work of Pearson
3The same analysis is offered by Provine (1971, pp. 22-23), Gayon (1998,
p. 105), Porter (1986, pp. 135, 284–285), and Radick (2011, p. 133).
4I also do not claim that Depew and Weber themselves argued that our fo-
cus should be exclusive in this way, or that they failed to notice the problems
that would result. They even come close to foreshadowing the account I will
develop in section 6 when they claim that “what was at stake in the conflict be-
2
and Weldon, which clearly fails to fit within these categories
– that drives me toward producing a novel approach to under-
standing the development of chance in evolution.
3. Darwin’s View
Now, let us rewind and consider Darwin’s position with re-
spect to the two primary historical events laid out above: is
Darwin’s own theory statistical, and does it purport to describe
objectively chancy processes?
3.1. Darwin on Statistics
Darwin’s relationship to statistics is fairly clear. While Dar-
win did have a copy of Quetelet’s Sur l’homme et le de´velop-
pement de ses faculte´s in his library (Rutherford, 1908, p. 69),
he did not directly utilize statistical methods in his own work.
As Manier notes, Darwin seemed to be unable to apply even a
slightly statistical conclusion, as in his reference to the distribu-
tion of general adaptations in birds arriving in a new environ-
ment (Darwin, 1837, B 55e), “without deprecating it as a facade
which concealed our ignorance” (Manier, 1978, pp. 122–123).
Porter rightly notes that Darwin’s work “can only in retrospect
be construed as statistical” (1986, p. 134). He goes on to de-
scribe a series of letters between Karl Pearson and Francis Gal-
ton (with input from several of Darwin’s descendants). Pearson
had hoped to show that Darwin’s own work ought truly be con-
sidered to be statistical (in line with Pearson’s own predilec-
tions), but Galton, after consulting with the Darwins, replied
that “I fear you must take it as a fact that Darwin had no liking
for statistics” (Porter, 1986, pp. 134–135nn.).
Thus we have, throughout the Origin, the pervasive feel-
ing that natural selection is intended to be a theory that utilizes
only traditional, non-statistical, even largely deterministic sorts
of explanations – explanations that are justifiable by Herschel’s
Newtonian-derived vera causa standard. Several authors, par-
ticularly Jon Hodge, have argued that Darwin’s theory was ex-
plicitly modeled on the ideal for scientific theorizing depicted
in Herschel’s Preliminary Discourse.5 It is for this reason that
Darwin was especially stung by Herschel’s dismissal of the Ori-
gin. “I have heard,” Darwin wrote in a letter, “by a round-about
channel, that Herschel says my book ‘is the law of higgeldy-
piggeldy.’ What exactly this means I do not know, but it is
evidently very contemptuous. If true this is a great blow and
discouragement” (Hull, 1973, p. 7). Darwin was no radical on
this score – he had hoped that his theory would be fully legiti-
mate by Herschel’s largely Newtonian and deterministic lights.
tween Fisher and Wright was how many of the conceptual resources of statis-
tical models are relevant to causal explanations of biological processes” (1995,
p. 286).
5Hodge’s contribution is a remarkable series of papers: (1977; 1987; 1989;
1992b; 2000; 2009). For others, see also Lennox (2005); Lewens (2009); Wa-
ters (2009); Hull (2009).
3.2. Darwin on Chance
What about Darwin’s relationship to some sort of concept
of objective chance? Within the evolutionary process, Darwin
identifies two loci where chance might operate. The first is the
role of chance in the generation of the variation upon which
natural selection is supposed to act. Frequently, Darwin argues
for the existence of this variation by extrapolation from our ex-
perience with domesticated plants and animals. “Can it, then,
be thought improbable,” he asks, “seeing that variations useful
to man have undoubtedly occurred, that other variations useful
to some being in the great and complex battle of life, should
sometimes occur in the course of thousands of generations?”
(Darwin, 1859, p. 80, emphasis added). Elsewhere he notes
that horticulture, throughout the ages, “has consisted in always
cultivating the best known variety, sowing its seeds, and, when
a slightly better variety has chanced to appear, selecting it, and
so onwards” (Darwin, 1859, p. 37, emphasis added).
He seems, however, to be uncomfortable with the promi-
nent role of chance here. At one point in the notebooks, dis-
cussing strength in blacksmiths, he writes that in addition to
the inheritance of acquired characters, “the other principle of
those children, which chance? produced with strong arms, out-
living the weaker ones, may be applicable to the formation of
instincts, independently of habits” (Darwin, 1838b, N 42). The
emphasis here is Darwin’s own – he seems to be a bit incredu-
lous that chance can be the proper explanation for the appear-
ance of variation, though he at the time has no better story to
offer. Throughout the development of evolutionary theory it is
“[m]ere chance, as we may call it, [that] might cause one vari-
ety to differ in some character from its parents” (Darwin, 1859,
p. 111).
The second role Darwin sees for chance in the process of
evolution derives from the fact that natural selection is not a per-
fect discriminator – it is merely the case that a profitable vari-
ation “will tend to the preservation of that individual” which
bears it, and this will lead that individual’s offspring to “thus
have a better chance of surviving” (Darwin, 1859, p. 61, em-
phasis added). It must surely be the case, he argues, that “in-
dividuals having any advantage, however slight, over others,
would have the best chance of surviving and of procreating
their kind” (Darwin, 1859, p. 81, emphasis added).6 Nothing,
however, guarantees a particular individual’s success – the best
the evolutionary process has to offer is the promise of higher
fitness. In a passage which nicely exhibits both of Darwin’s
senses of chance, he writes that natural selection is the process
by which “every slight modification, which in the course of ages
chanced to arise, and which in any way favoured the individu-
als of any of the species, by better adapting them to their altered
conditions, would tend to be preserved” (Darwin, 1859, p. 82,
emphasis added).
6References to organisms’ “chance of surviving” or “chance of leaving off-
spring” are one of Darwin’s most frequent refrains, and are incredibly common
throughout Darwin’s work. For only a small (!) cross-section of examples, see
Darwin (1838a, E 137), Darwin (1859, pp. 5, 88, 90–92, 104, 109, 114, 127,
136, 176, 235, 388), Darwin (1871, pp. 161, 265, 319–320, 406, 414).
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What does Darwin actually mean by the term ‘chance’ in
these two invocations? Excepting some mentions of something
like the law of large numbers,7 Darwin rarely discusses what
he takes the correct interpretation of chance to be. One of his
only sustained considerations of the issue, at the beginning of
the fourth chapter of the Origin, is commonly cited:
I have hitherto sometimes spoken as if the varia-
tions – so common and multiform in organic be-
ings under domestication, and in a lesser degree in
those in a state of nature – had been due to chance.
This, of course, is a wholly incorrect expression,
but it serves to acknowledge plainly our ignorance
of the cause of each particular variation. (Darwin,
1859, p. 131)
This is as direct an expression of a subjective, unpredictability,
or ignorance interpretation of chance as we might hope to find.
Darwin explains that whenever he makes reference to “chance,”
it is merely an indication that we lack knowledge or predictive
power with respect to the particular causes of the phenomenon
at issue. He goes on to note that one might ascribe the source
of variation to the reproductive system, the conditions of life of
the parents, climate, food, and so forth. All of these are, that is,
possible true causes of variation – we simply lack the precision
to determine which is genuinely responsible for variation in a
given case (or even in the majority of cases).8
Finally, we have Darwin’s famous discussion of chance from
the Variation. He considers the objection, by that point quite
familiar, that “selection explains nothing, because we know not
the cause of each individual difference in the structure of each
being” (Darwin, 1875, p. 427). To reply to this objection, Dar-
win asks us to consider an analogy. When rock falls from the
face of a cliff, he argues, we might call the shape of the frag-
ments that result accidental,
but this is not strictly correct; for the shape of each
depends on a long sequence of events, all obey-
ing natural laws; on the nature of the rock, on the
lines of deposition or cleavage, on the form of the
mountain, which depends on its upheaval and sub-
sequent denudation, and lastly on the storm or earth-
quake which throws down the fragments. (Darwin,
1875, p. 427)
We then imagine assembling a structure from these stone frag-
ments. Of course, Darwin argues, an omniscient creator could
foresee all these events. But ought we really infer that all the
natural laws that caused the stone to take its current shape ex-
ist for the sake of the structure that the builder builds? Clearly
not, he implies. It is in this sense that the shape of the stones
is accidental. And natural selection works in the same way.
Many of the variations in organisms are not useful or pleasing
to either man or to the animal itself (and many of the artifically
7See, e.g., Darwin (1871, p. 316), Darwin (1837, B 55e).
8This discussion is even more explicit in the sixth edition of the Origin
(Darwin, 1876, pp. 6–8).
selected variations which are pleasing to man are deleterious to
the organisms). They are the result of lawlike causal processes,
but there is no sense – divine or otherwise – in which the laws
are the way they are for the sake of the development of some
particular character in some particular organism. There is no
overarching pattern to find, and for this reason, and only in this
sense, can we view the evolutionary process as “chancy.”
All these examples are traditionally cited when discussing
Darwin’s understanding of chance, and the standard reading of
Darwin summarizes them by claiming that he held an ignorance
interpretation of chance.9 But this agreement masks the inter-
esting depth of Darwin’s thought on the matter. We see through-
out these quotes an interplay of three distinct ways of under-
standing chance. First is simple subjective unpredictability, as
he invokes in the case of variation – the inability of a given
observer with a given set of evidence to predict the precise out-
come of some system. Second, and much more important for
Darwin, is the concept of ‘accident’, which we see in the dis-
cussion of the stone arch – the lack of any sort of overarching
design, any “for the sake of which” or final cause. Finally we
have objective chance, which Darwin consistently interprets as
some sort of lack of causation.
This last sense – objective chance – is categorically rejected
by Darwin. It is clear that Manier is correct when he states
that Darwin “attributed no causal force to chance itself” (1978,
p. 121). All causes, in Darwin’s view, are still perfectly Newto-
nian; both the stone building example in the Variation and the
discussion of variation in the sixth edition of the Origin are very
clear about this position. Variation, in general, is more about
unpredictability for Darwin – it is the bulk material, viewed
throughout the Origin as a black box, a fact that provides a nec-
essary and empirically well-confirmed (if inexplicable) input to
the evolutionary process.
When Darwin discusses the possibility of chance in the pro-
cess of natural selection, on the other hand, his worry is with
design, and hence he is primarily concerned in this arena with
chance in the sense of accident. The particular sequence of
variations which any particular population undergoes lacks any
master plan, and is thus to this extent a matter of chance. While
it is therefore a consequence of selection that many features of
organisms are accidental, Darwin still rejected objective chance
as applied to the process of selection. To return to our original
question, then – whether or not Darwin thought the evolution-
ary process was objectively chancy – we have ample evidence
to answer it firmly in the negative. Evolution does not involve
objectively chancy processes for Darwin.
Such, then, is the state of affairs as of 1859. Darwin has
proposed the theory of evolution by natural selection, a non-
statistical theory of non-objectively-chancy processes in nature.
Complex processes, to be sure – processes the details of which
may forever escape our knowledge. But the theory itself is in-
tended to conform to Herschel’s vera causa ideal, which, ac-
cording to Herschel, grounds the explanatory power and prowess
9Commentators to argue for such a view include Hull (1973, pp. 62, 426–
427), Hodge (1987, p. 243), Depew and Weber (1995, p. 113), and Beatty
(2006, p. 630).
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of Newtonian mechanics. While Darwin may have been far
more willing to appeal to (again, his sense of) chance than many
of his contemporaries, and while he may have placed much
more of the living world under the guidance of an accidental
process free of final causes than those who had come before
him, we don’t see a drastic shift in the role of either statisti-
cal theorizing or objective chance in Darwin’s work. As of yet,
we have seen neither of the historical events for which we are
searching. Let us then move forward to Francis Galton.
4. Statistical Theories: Francis Galton
What was the main driving force behind the introduction of
statistics into the theory of evolution by natural selection? As
it turns out, it was an old problem. As early as the “Sketch”
of 1842, Darwin was worried about blending inheritance. He
writes that “if in any country or district all animals of one species
be allowed freely to cross, any small tendency in them to vary
will be constantly counteracted” (Darwin, 1909, p. 3), destroy-
ing the power of natural selection to alter the species. The point
was made far more serious in the review of the Origin by the
engineer Fleeming Jenkin (1867).
Gayon notes that the thrust of this paper is often misunder-
stood (1998, pp. 96–97). Jenkin is not merely concerned with
the apparent reliance of Darwin’s theory on “sports,” or large
deviations of characters from parent to offspring. Rather, he
notes the following two interrelated (and much more complex
and significant) problems with Darwin’s theory as expressed in
the Origin. First, how is variation distributed? If the distribu-
tion is continuous, then we must use statistics to describe it. If,
on the other hand, it is not a continuous, populational sort of
variation, but rather individual and isolated instances, these in-
stances must be measured, and the odds of some particular vari-
ation being eliminated by chance must be determined. Second,
what is the method of transmission of characters to offspring?
If offspring carry a mixture of the characters of their parents,
as Darwin and most others assumed, how can the problem of
regression to the mean be avoided?
Depew and Weber argue that Darwin’s own response to this
problem is highly unsatisfactory. In the last two editions of the
Origin, all he does to respond to this charge is to posit the ex-
istence of more continuous variation and fewer “sports” – as
Depew and Weber note, “by fiat,” changing the singular nouns
referring to variation to plurals (1995, p. 196). Given that Dar-
win’s response here was so unsatisfying, what was to be done
about the problems that Jenkin raised? The long-term solution,
of course, was the rejection of the blending model of inher-
itance. But this would have to wait for the “rediscovery” of
Mendel’s paper and the birth of genetics, almost thirty years
after Darwin’s death (Druery and Bateson, 1901).
In the meanwhile, defenders of Darwin’s theory sought refuge
in statistics – establishing how natural selection could work in a
gradualist, statistical manner on populational, continuous vari-
ation. The most prominent early defender was Darwin’s cousin
Francis Galton. The publication of Darwin’s Origin sparked
in him a deep interest in breeding – particularly in eugenics
and the heredity of human intelligence and other abilities. To
that end, Galton found two things unsettling about the trouble
with blending inheritance. First was the potential undermining
of his cousin’s theory of evolution by natural selection, which
Galton had described in a letter to Darwin as engendering “a
feeling that one rarely experiences after boyish days, of hav-
ing been initiated into an entirely new province of knowledge
which, nevertheless, connects itself with other things in a thou-
sand ways” (Galton and Darwin, 1859). But second, and more
importantly, were the eugenic implications of the blending ar-
gument. Unless heredity and variation work in precisely the
right way, it remains possible that the eugenic program is a fail-
ure before it begins: that even with the aid of severe eugenic
programs, we will still be unable to preserve “superior” charac-
ters within the families that are entitled to them.
Thus was the problem of blending inheritance doubly mag-
nified for Galton. How did he propose to resolve it? He began
with a radically different view of the way in which inheritance
operates. Relatively early during his study of heredity, Gal-
ton shifted to a population-based, statistical view of the trans-
mission of characters from parents to offspring (Porter, 1986,
p. 136). Galton used this perspective to develop a view of par-
ticulate inheritance on which many small heritable factors –
some “latent” and some “developed” or “patent” in the adult
– combine and compete for a small number of “places” within
the offspring. The closest metaphor we can create for such in-
heritance, Galton writes, is this. Consider “an urn containing a
great number of balls, marked in various ways, and a handful to
be drawn out of them at random as a sample: this sample would
represent the person of a parent [his or her developed charac-
ters].” Then we mix another, similarly sized urn in with the
first, representing the contribution of the other parent, and draw
out a second sample. “There can be no nearer connexion justly
conceived to subsist between the parent and child than between
the two samples” (Galton, 1872, p. 400).
The very foundations of heredity, therefore, can now be
considered statistically – as a vast, population-level urn-drawing
experiment. Heredity thus was, from the time of Galton’s first
articles on the subject, best dealt with at the statistical level.
From here, we can turn toward mathematizing the relationship
between parent and offspring.
The primary mathematical contribution to evolutionary the-
orizing made by Galton himself, the law of ancestral hered-
ity, describes the extent to which the contribution of heritable
characters in ancestors influences the characters of offspring –
“the integration of all hereditary phenomena in a single concep-
tual framework or expression,” in the words of Gayon (1998,
p. 132). In Natural Inheritance, Galton describes the law as
follows:
[T]he influence, pure and simple, of the Mid-Parent
[the average of the mother and father] may be taken
as 12 and that of the Mid-Grand-Parent [the average
of all four grandparents] as 14 , and so on. Conse-
quently the influence of the individual Parent would
be 14 , and of the individual Grand-Parent
1
16 , and so
on. (Galton, 1889, p. 136)
Galton is attempting to do the following. Consider the charac-
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ters of an offspring. We know that there is a strong force of
regression to the mean, so the interesting question becomes: at
what fidelity are the characters of parents (and earlier ancestors)
transmitted to their offspring? Galton first determined empiri-
cally that the coefficient of correlation between sons and ‘mid-
parents’ was 23 . However, this correlation includes not only
characters from the parents themselves, but also some from the
grandparents passed on to the parents and then the offspring –
we have to “factor out” this grandparental contribution if we
want to determine the “pure” contribution of the parent. By
two separate estimations (one assuming a constant diminution
of transmission in all generations and one assuming a diminu-
tion that increases over time), Galton arrives at the value of 12
for the mid-parent contribution.
Galton’s technical conclusions aside, we can clearly see the
tools and methods of statistics deeply embedded in his work.
The value upon which the entire derivation of the law of an-
cestral heredity rests, the mid-parent to offspring correlation of
2
3 , was determined empirically via regression on measurements
of height, and Galton sought to confirm it via statistical mea-
surement of moth populations, human eye-color, artistic talent,
disease, and so forth. Galton has, indisputably, brought statis-
tics to a central component of evolution, and statistics proved
to be here to stay. We thus very clearly find in the work of Gal-
ton the first historical event for which we have been searching
– evolutionary theorizing now involves statistical methods.
But note the depth of the use of statistics – Galton’s concern
with eugenics and breeding means that we only have this statis-
tical viewpoint in heredity, not in any other, related biological
theories. Galton at times gestures at a statistical view of natural
selection (e.g., Galton, 1877b, p. 533), but not in anything like
a robust or empirically grounded way. The thorough integration
of statistics into further areas of evolution would be executed by
Pearson and Weldon, to whom we will turn below.
4.1. Galton on Chance
What about the role of objective chance in Galton’s theo-
rizing? He is nearly silent on this issue, but we can divine two
conclusions. First, return to Galton’s discussion of his statisti-
cal theory of heredity. Galton sees both the transmission of el-
ements to offspring and the development of organisms as com-
plex but necessarily strictly Newtonian or mechanistic causal
processes. He describes “segregation” as a straightforward pro-
cess of competition (which Radick (2011) has likened to natural
selection), saying that “for each place [in an organism’s set of
developed characters] there have been many unsuccessful but
qualified competitors” (Galton, 1872, p. 395). On development,
he says that if we had sufficient information, “statistical expe-
riences would no doubt enable us to predict the average value
of the form into which they would become developed . . . but
the individual variation of each case would of course be great,
owing to the large number of variable influences concerned in
the process of development” (Galton, 1872, p. 396, emphasis
added). This sounds much like Quetelet’s view of social statis-
tics as the result of the aggregation of a myriad small, non-
statistical causes.
Figure 1: Galton’s quincunx device used to demonstrate the normal curve. Fig-
ure 7 from Galton (1889, p. 63).
Second, we can consider Galton’s famous use of the quin-
cunx device. Consider the outcome of dropping a handful of
shot into the top of the device in figure 1. The shot falls through
the series of pins set in the board, and collects at the bottom in
a series of bins. The shot will, Galton notes, pile up in these
bins in precisely the distribution described by the normal curve
(shown at the bottom of the device). Importantly for us, con-
sider Galton’s description of how the device approximates the
law of errors:
The principle on which the action of the appara-
tus depends is, that a number of small and inde-
pendent accidents befall each shot in its career. In
rare cases, a long run of luck continues to favour
the course of a particular shot towards either out-
side place, but in the large majority of instances
the number of accidents that cause Deviation to the
right, balance in a greater or less degree those that
cause Deviation to the left. [ . . . ] This illustrates
and explains why mediocrity is so common. (Gal-
ton, 1889, pp. 64–65)
Setting aside, for our purposes, the moral overtone present in
Galton’s invocation of ‘mediocrity’, here we have another in-
stance of precisely the same sense of chance we saw expressed
by Darwin. The law of errors is nothing more or less than the
record of a very large number of small, deterministic causes
acting on the same system over time – and it is merely our ig-
norance, or our inability to follow those “runs of luck,” that
makes the use of statistics necessary.
But the full tale of Galton’s view of chance must be slightly
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more complicated than this. For the analogy between the quin-
cunx and the “large number of variable influences” in heredity
is not a perfect one. The most common way of describing the
law of errors in Galton’s day comes from Quetelet, who, Gal-
ton was right to note, believed that the “essence” of the law of
errors “is that differences should be wholly due to the collec-
tive actions of a host of independent petty influences in various
combinations, as was represented by the teeth of the harrow [in
the quincunx]” (Galton, 1877a, p. 512). Quetelet, that is, had
argued that a normal distribution arises by subjecting an object
(be it a piece of shot or a person) to a long sequence of minor
(or “petty”), independent causes, leading to the pattern of “runs
of luck” and “balance” that Galton described.10 But this cannot
be the full explanation of heredity, despite the fact that heredity
produces normal distributions. “[A]lthough characteristics of
plants and animals conform to the law [of errors],” he argues,
“the reason of their doing so is as yet totally unexplained,” be-
cause the processes of heredity “are not petty influences, but
very important ones” (Galton, 1877a, p. 512). Far from the
minor tweaks to the direction of the shot applied by the teeth
of the quincunx, the influences of heredity dramatically shape
the course of an organism’s life. Thus, we are forced to con-
clude “that the processes of heredity must work harmoniously
with the law of deviation, and be themselves in some sense con-
formable to it” (Galton, 1877a, p. 512). While Galton does not
therefore believe the statistical account of heredity is a direct
analogue of the behavior of the quincunx, we must explain the
fact that the various non-statistical and decidedly non-petty pro-
cesses of heredity are “conformable” to statistical explanation.
Whatever the account of this coincidence, we clearly have
no cause for inferring anything other than an interpretation of
chance as unpredictability for Galton. The laws derived for the
various processes of heredity, he argues, “may never be exactly
correct in any one case, but at the same time they will always
be approximately true and always serviceable for explanation”
(Galton, 1877b, p. 532). It is clear that it is merely our igno-
rance of the precise details of these processes that makes higher-
level statistical laws necessary and particularly “serviceable.” If
we are looking for the first invocation of objective chance, we
are not to find it in the work of Galton.
5. Pearson and Weldon: Minor Characters?
Following the narrative of Depew and Weber, we would
now move our focus forward to the work of Sewall Wright,
where we would find the first instance of chancy evolutionary
processes in his shifting-balance theory. Wright argued that (as
one of the phases of the shifting-balance process) the chancy
influence of genetic drift could produce novelty by driving a
population down a fitness gradient, against the direction of se-
lection, moving it across a “valley” of lower fitness to a new
10Quetelet himself called these “accidental causes,” which “only manifest
themselves fortuitously and act indifferently in any direction” (Quetelet in 1846,
quoted in Hankins, 1908, p. 129). It is these causes that produce the vari-
ance seen in a normally distributed quantity, by contrast with “constant” causes,
which set the mean.
local optimum. We will not here, however, evaluate this sec-
ond historical event – Depew and Weber may well be quite
correct that the first instance of objectively chancy theories is
found in the work of Wright. Rather, I want to advance a much
shorter increment, to two of Galton’s students – Karl Pearson
and W.F.R. Weldon.
Pearson, whose life has been masterfully detailed by Porter
(2004), was a particularly interesting character. He studied at
Cambridge, and after having received his degree with Math-
ematical Honors, departed for Germany, becoming deeply af-
fected by the Romantic tradition and publishing and lecturing
on German history.11 He developed an intense interest in social-
ist politics as well as women’s rights. Finally, upon returning to
England, he was appointed chair of Applied Mathematics and
Mechanics at University College, London, where he was pri-
marily occupied with teaching mathematics to students of engi-
neering. His work there, which included teaching geometry and
drawing, would have a substantial influence on the significant
visual aspect of his later work in statistics.
His completion of William Kingdon Clifford’s Common Sense
of the Exact Sciences (1885) provided an early glimpse of Pear-
son’s philosophy of the physical sciences. Broadly positivist in
nature – that is, emphasizing the importance of mathematical
formulae in the development of scientific knowledge and es-
pousing a strict form of empiricism – he would go on to develop
this philosophy of science in his widely known magnum opus,
the Grammar of Science, first published in 1892 and later re-
vised and expanded (with more material on evolution) in 1900.
W.F.R. Weldon, known as Raphael, was born in 1860.12 He
attended University College and later King’s College, study-
ing biology under Lankester and Balfour. After obtaining his
degree, he worked at both the Naples Zoological Station and
Cambridge, finally being appointed as Lecturer in Invertebrate
Morphology at University College, London, in 1884. He be-
came quite active in the Marine Biological Laboratory at Ply-
mouth after its completion in 1888, eventually running several
large-scale experiments there.
In 1890, Weldon was appointed to the Jodrell Professor-
ship of Zoology at University College, London, and Weldon
and Pearson quickly formed a friendship. Pearson had been
driven to the study of biology by reading Galton’s Natural In-
heritance, which had been published the year before (Pearson,
1936, pp. 210–211), and, early in 1890, Weldon had published
his first work applying statistics to biology (Weldon, 1890).
The mathematics in Weldon’s paper had been prepared under
the direct tutelage of Galton himself, who was sent the paper
as a referee (Pearson, 1906, p. 17). A bit later, in November
1891, Pearson delivered the first of the Gresham College Lec-
tures in Geometry. He would go on to deliver thirty lectures
in this series on the subject of chance and statistics – in par-
ticular, focusing on visual aids and graphical representations of
various kinds to make the material accessible to a broad stu-
11This brief biography follows that presented by Pearson’s son in Pearson
(1936).
12This brief biography follows Pearson’s memorial of Weldon (Pearson,
1906). No scholarly biography of Weldon has as yet been prepared.
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dent audience (Porter, 2004, pp. 235–236). As time went on,
however, evolution featured ever more strongly in the lecture
content. We can see, Porter notes, “a vision . . . taking form,
even as he wrote his lectures, that evolution by natural selection
could be comprehended statistically” (Porter, 2004, p. 238).
By this point, then, the collaboration between Pearson and
Weldon was off to the races. Nearly all of Weldon’s papers from
1893 until his untimely death from pneumonia in 1906 involved
statistical collaboration with Pearson, and Pearson would pub-
lish a series of some twelve papers titled “Mathematical Con-
tributions to the Theory of Evolution,” describing various ap-
plications of statistical methodology to the evolutionary pro-
cess. With Weldon’s death and the increasingly hostile climate
of the battle between the biometricians and Mendelians, Pear-
son would largely abandon the study of biology after 1906, tak-
ing over the directorship of Galton’s Eugenics Laboratory at
University College (Pearson, 1936; Magnello, 1999a,b).
Let us now consider how Pearson and Weldon fare as re-
gards the two historical events that have formed our framework
here: do they utilize statistical methods for the study of evo-
lution, and do they consider this to be undergirded by an ob-
jective notion of chance extant in the world? We will discover
that, on Depew and Weber’s view, Pearson and Weldon are rel-
atively garden-variety: their situation with respect to our two
focal questions is identical with their mentor Galton’s.
As far as the statistical nature of evolutionary theorizing,
whereas Galton deployed statistical methods primarily within
the study of heredity, Pearson and Weldon also brought statis-
tics to the study of variation, inheritance, correlation, and nat-
ural and sexual selection – a much broader swath of biolog-
ical theories. While Galton, as we mentioned above, viewed
portions of evolutionary theory statistically, much more of evo-
lution was to be studied statistically for Pearson and Weldon.
Pearson, for example, in the second edition of his Grammar of
Science, claims that only the growth of the statistical picture of
evolution had made it possible to provide a “precise definition
of fundamental biological concepts” (1900, p. 372). We thus
have the introduction of a thoroughgoing statistical methodol-
ogy in portions of evolutionary theorizing where Galton’s use
of statistics had only been cursory. Pearson and Weldon’s com-
bination of mathematics and experiment was exceptionally pro-
ductive.
What about their views on the role of an objective notion
of chance in biology? Because of the positivist bent in Pear-
son’s work, he did not believe, nor could he consistently have
believed, that our scientific theories somehow latch onto objec-
tive chance in the world. Objective, reified chance is an inhabi-
tant of the realm of things-in-themselves, which Pearson barred
from his philosophy. He thus offers an ignorance interpretation
of the scientific use of probabilities, just as Galton and Darwin
had before him. In a section titled “The Bases of Laplace’s
Theory lie in an Experience as to Ignorance” (Pearson, 1892,
p. 171), he argues that the underlying justification behind the
use of probabilistic claims in science is an equiprobability as-
sumption, and this equiprobability assumption is justified as the
best course of action in the face of ignorance: “In our ignorance
we ought to consider before experience that nature may consist
of all routines, all anomalies, or a mixture of the two in any pro-
portion whatever, and that all such are equiprobable” (Pearson,
1892, p. 172). He goes on to offer an extensive justification of
why our past experience with situations of incomplete informa-
tion does indeed justify the use of equiprobability as a canon of
legitimate inference.
Weldon, as well, affirms a straightforward interpretation of
chance as subjective unpredictability. In a lecture he delivered
the year before his death (to which we will return later), he
argued that “all experience, which we are obliged to deal with
statistically, is experience of results which depend upon a great
number of complicated conditions, so many and so difficult to
observe that we cannot tell in any given case what their effect
will be” (Weldon, 1906, p. 97). Weldon, again, follows Darwin,
Galton, and Pearson in adopting a notion of chance grounded
entirely in ignorance. The introduction of an objective notion
of chance in evolution is not to be found in the work of either
Pearson or Weldon.
6. A New Question
The explanation given by the standard history of the early
development of chance in evolution is relatively straightfor-
ward. We begin with Darwin, who develops a non-statistical
theory of non-objectively-chancy biological systems. Galton,
endeavoring to respond to the troubles of blending inheritance,
statisticalizes the theory of heredity. Pearson and Weldon ex-
pand this usage of statistics to selection itself, making them
only methodological innovators. Neither Galton nor his stu-
dents discard Darwin’s ignorance interpretation of chance in
the objective biological world – this was Sewall Wright’s do-
ing, introducing objective chance in the context of his shifting
balance theory.
If we consider merely the two events brought out in Depew
and Weber’s analysis, it is not obvious why Pearson and Wel-
don are even worthy of mention at all, much less of a systematic
development of their views on chance. Pearson and Weldon in-
novate only in terms of the use of statistical methodology to
understand evolution – they have nothing new to offer in terms
of their conceptual or philosophical views. On the contrary,
the case of Pearson and Weldon, I argue, is an excellent ex-
ample for use in teasing apart more thoroughly the history of
the introduction of concepts of chance in evolutionary theoriz-
ing. Most worryingly, if we adopt Depew and Weber’s focus
on objective chance, two issues make it difficult even to frame
the question of Pearson and Weldon’s use of such a concept.
First, as with all examinations of the conceptual entailments of
biological theories, we are hampered by biologists’ uncertain
attitude toward the metaphysical or ontological claims of their
theories (see, e.g., Waters, 2011, on ‘toolbox’ theorizing). Sec-
ond, despite the fact that some early work on chance in the late
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries did make room for the
possibility of genuine indeterminism in the sense that Depew
and Weber consider, we have no evidence that ‘chance’ in this
sense was a concept entertained by any of the authors whose
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work we have considered here.13
Pearson and Weldon, however, were far from silent on the
proper role of and philosophical justification for the use of con-
cepts of chance in evolution. A schism that developed between
the two men, often unremarked-upon in the historical literature,
reveals that they were engaged in a serious, long-standing de-
bate over precisely this issue. What problem, then, drove them
to develop well-considered justifications for the role and utility
of chance?
This, I claim, is precisely the impetus we need to develop
a new way of understanding the role of chance in the early de-
velopment of evolution. The two historical events of the De-
pew and Weber view do not capture the philosophical work of
Pearson and Weldon, so it is beholden upon us to find a way
of framing the issues that allows us to recognize and compre-
hend it. The best candidate for this new question, I argue, is
this: What is the relationship between biological systems and
the statistical theories used to describe them? This question
lets us most clearly see the subtle difference between Weldon
and Pearson’s views, and enables us to better explore this facet
of the early history of chance in evolution.
6.1. Pearson contra Weldon
Let’s return to Pearson’s philosophy of science. Though the
two men were unknown to each other at the time, we can rec-
ognize what we would now call a “Machian” view of physics
as much of the motivation for Pearson’s Grammar – indeed,
Mach would write to Pearson in 1897, plaintively noting “how
useful would it have been for me to know back in 1872 that
I didn’t stand alone in my efforts.”14 Pearson focuses exten-
sively on the usefulness of science for the economy of thought,
denigrates the speculative use of ‘metaphysics’ in science, and
extensively praises an austere form of empiricism.
In the Grammar of Science, for example, he writes that the
last step of the scientific method is
the discovery by aid of the disciplined imagination
of a brief statement or formula, which in a few
words resumes the whole range of facts. Such a
formula . . . is termed a scientific law. The object
served by the discovery of such laws is the econ-
omy of thought. (Pearson, 1892, p. 93)
Further, the discovery of these simplified laws of nature must
remain the central focus of our work in the biological sciences
in particular. In the second edition of Pearson’s Grammar, he
notes that the advance of statistical biology “enables me to de-
fine several of these conceptions much more accurately than
was possible in 1892” (Pearson, 1900, pp. viii–ix). Statistics
13For various objective uses of chance prior to the introduction of quan-
tum mechanics, see, for example, Sto¨ltzner (2008) on the Exner school in
physics, Beatty (1984) for a brief mention of the relationship between Darwin
and Peirce’s tychism, or Dale (1999, p. 399) for John Venn’s frequentist theory
of probability.
14“Wie werthvoll wa¨re es mir gewesen schon 1872 zu wissen, dass ich mit
meinen Bestrebungen nicht allein stehe.” Ernst Mach to Karl Pearson, Jul. 12,
1897, published in Thiele (1969, p. 537).
has finally endowed us with the ability to demonstrate evolu-
tion’s action quantitatively. After discussing the various types
of selection that have been proposed, Pearson writes that “be-
fore we can accept [any cause of progressive change] as a fac-
tor we must not only have shown its plausibility, but if possi-
ble have demonstrated its quantitative validity” (Pearson, 1900,
p. 380).
And when such a focus on statistics has failed to hold (in
particular, in the study of variation) it has led to a stagnation in
biology – in Pearson’s words,
largely owing to a certain prevalence of almost meta-
physical speculation as to the causes of heredity,
which have usurped the place of that careful col-
lection and elaborate experiment by which alone
sufficient data might have been accumulated, with
a view to ultimately narrowing and specialising the
circumstances under which correlation was mea-
sured. (Pearson, 1896a, p. 255)
We can thus see a profound trend in Pearson’s thought, re-
inforced throughout his work both in the general philosophy of
science and specifically in biometry. For him, laws of nature are
nothing more than brief formulas describing a trend in observed
data, useful first and foremost for economizing thought and en-
abling prediction. The same is true for causes, as well – he
argues that causation is nothing more than the experience “that
a certain sequence has occurred and recurred in the past” (Pear-
son, 1892, p. 136), such sequences being described, of course,
by mathematized laws of nature.
Now, let’s turn to Weldon. As I mentioned briefly above, in
1906, a lecture by Weldon on the topic of inheritance (delivered
the previous year) was published in a volume of Lectures on the
Method of Science. While the bulk of the lecture is relatively
uninteresting (if not downright confusing), Weldon begins by
offering a conceptual defense of his use of statistical methods.
In physics, he argues, we have two uses for statistical in-
ference. First, it averages over errors in measurement. Weldon
gives the example of the determination of the latitude of the
Radcliffe Observatory – even though highly skilled workers are
responsible for its measurement, the values obtained fall into
a range, in terms of the observatory’s position, of about thirty-
four yards (Weldon, 1906, p. 86). One function of taking a sin-
gle number and declaring it the latitude of the observatory, then,
is to average over small errors in these various measurements.
Second, statistics generates values that we wish to utilize in cal-
culations. Weldon notes that even though it may be the case that
there is no single value for the latitude of the observatory (due
to, for example, changes over time in the position of the equa-
tor), we still may use statistics for “attributing to the latitude of
the Radcliffe telescope a constancy it does not really possess”
(Weldon, 1906, p. 88).
The ideal, then, in the physical sciences, is to be able to use
a method which can separate these two sorts of discrepancy –
which can describe all of the results thus far obtained, discard-
ing human error in measurement without discarding the genuine
variability in the data. Should we apply statistics to biology in
precisely the same way? No, Weldon argues. The variation in
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the biological case is too great. “[I]f I tell you,” he writes, “that
Englishmen are 5 feet 7 12 inches high, you remember your fa-
ther who is five feet ten, and your cousin who is over six feet,
and you think I am talking nonsense” (Weldon, 1906, p. 94).
The kind of simplifying use of statistics deployed in the phys-
ical sciences doesn’t work in biology. Rather, we need a way
to capture all of the variation in biological systems – we need
to collect and preserve statistical data in its entirety, in order to
come up with a complete description of our observations. He
writes
If we want to make a statement about the stature
of Englishmen, we must find a way of describing
our whole experience; we must find some simple
way of describing our whole experience, so that
we can easily remember and communicate to oth-
ers how many men of any given height we find
among a thousand Englishmen. We must give up
the attempt to replace our experiences by a simple
average value and try to describe the whole series
of results our observation has yielded. (Weldon,
1906, p. 94)
Here, I think, we see the first glimmer of a profound differ-
ence between Pearson and Weldon. Statistics in biometry, as
described here, is most emphatically not useful for the econ-
omization of thought or the simplification of phenomena, as
we saw in Pearson above. Statistics is a way of describing all
the results which we have obtained thus far, of preserving all
our experience, not simplifying it. Weldon brings statistics to
biometry, then, to preserve diversity – very nearly the opposite
of Pearson’s motivation.
We can see this distinction between the two men confirmed
elsewhere as well. An extended debate in the correspondence
pages of Nature in 1895 and 1896 focused, in large part, on
Weldon’s own definition of causation. For Weldon, causation
and correlation are identical. As the issue is reported by an
incredulous E. Ray Lankester, Weldon describes Lankester as
“illogical” for suggesting that we might declare the “cause” of
survival in malarial regions to be due to some unknown property
of the blood. “‘It is,’ said Prof. Weldon, ‘impossible logically to
separate these two correlated phenomena. The coloured skin is
as much a cause of the survival of the dark man as is the germ-
destroying property of his blood’” (Lankester, 1896, p. 245).
For Weldon, that is, causation simply is correlation. And while
we might later break these correlations by performing exper-
iments or providing new data, until such tests are performed
the complete causal picture of the scenario is encapsulated by
the statistics. Oddly, Weldon seems to think that Hume would
agree – he cites Hume’s definition from the Inquiry of cause
as constant conjunction in a later letter (Weldon, 1896, p. 294),
implying that his appeal to statistical distributions would pass
muster as a variety of Humean constant conjunction.
Perhaps most tellingly of all, Pearson responds to the fight
between Weldon and Lankester – and sides with Lankester.
On the second point [causation], surely Prof. Lankester
is entirely in the right? It is not sufficient to show
that there is a correlation between a certain frontal
ratio and death-rate [in Weldon’s experiments on
crabs] in order to assert that the frontal ratio is a
cause of death-rate. Very probably it may be, but
the definition is not logically complete, or at any
rate a definition of cause has been adopted which
does not appear of much utility to science. (Pear-
son, 1896b, pp. 460–461)
The upshot of Pearson’s response should be clear from our (ad-
mittedly brief) discussion of the two men’s use of statistics,
causation, and laws.15 For Pearson, the sort of simple corre-
lation described by Weldon is too weak a form of functional de-
pendence to support the inference of causation. We need more
data to make the description “logically complete” – to provide
us with a more robust formula, something more closely resem-
bling the functional laws of Newtonian mechanics.
While this distinction has been drawn quickly, we can see
some general conclusions about the ways in which the two men
approach the statistical method. For Pearson, science is a posi-
tivist enterprise aimed at the economy of thought, with statistics
useful for simplification of data. Causation, then, to the extent
that it remains a relevant concept at all, is cashed out in terms
of laws of nature, which are precise instances of functional de-
pendence (modeled after Newtonian mechanics). For Weldon,
on the contrary, ideal science is the complete description of na-
ture, and statistics is the best tool we have to capture the wide
diversity of causal influences in biological cases. Causation just
is correlation, and the purpose of experiment is to sharpen these
correlations.
Most importantly, we can see that the two historical events
described by the standard history do not give us any leverage
on this distinction whatsoever. There’s no hint of “objective” or
“reified” chance in the work of either of these thinkers, as I ar-
gued in the last section – yet we still have an incredibly interest-
ing scientific and philosophical difference between the two men
which is worthy of study. What possible question might we ask
that would allow us to take this distinction into account? Again,
I claim that it is this: what is the relationship between our sta-
tistical theories and the world those theories are intended to
describe?
On this axis, we can see that the two men are quite dif-
ferent. Pearson’s positivist use of statistics as an intermediate
step on the way to fully rigorized scientific knowledge entails
that, for him, scientific theories are merely provisional, and, it
would seem, necessarily acausal and anti-realist. Knowledge of
biological processes “in the world” is meaningless for Pearson,
and it is even doubtful that we would ever be able to provide
sufficiently detailed theories in biology to qualify as fully rig-
orous law by Pearson’s standards.
Weldon, on the other hand, nearly collapses the distinction
between scientific theories and the corresponding processes in
15More detail on both the debate between Weldon, Pearson, and Lankester
and the context of the 1906 Weldon lecture can be found in Pence (2011). Wel-
don’s lecture is also discussed by Radick (2011). I can find no other citation or
discussion of this lecture, so I have no evidence that it was read by Pearson and
Weldon’s contemporaries.
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the world. The statistical descriptions deployed by the theory,
for Weldon, just are descriptions of the systems’ causal struc-
ture – the final aim of science for Weldon, it seems, is to con-
struct a complete statistical picture of the world.
Approaching the case of Pearson and Weldon by consider-
ing the question of the relationship between statistical theories
and biological processes, then, is incredibly fruitful. It lets us
contextualize both the extensive work of the two authors in jus-
tifying the role of statistics in biological practice, and it enables
us to see precisely where and why the two men disagreed when
they did, on the matter of how we successfully obtain causal
knowledge about a biological system.
7. Conclusion
Let me conclude a bit more speculatively. (If one is disin-
clined to countenance speculation, I also note that the histori-
cal claim for which I’ve argued above stands independently of
the value of this closing idea.) For those who have been fol-
lowing contemporary philosophy of biology in the last decade,
the novel question I posit here will not seem so novel after all.
Precisely the same worry about the relationship between statis-
tical theories and biological processes has been hotly debated,
under the guise of the “causalist/statisticalist debate.” On the
one side, we have “causalists,” who argue that natural selec-
tion and genetic drift describe causally efficacious processes
(e.g., Brandon, 1978; Mills and Beatty, 1979; Hodge, 1987;
Stephens, 2004; Ramsey, 2006; Abrams, 2009; Otsuka et al.,
2011). They are opposed by the “statisticalists,” who claim on
the contrary that these theories are merely statistical summaries
of genuinely causal events at the level of the individual organ-
ism (e.g., Matthen and Ariew, 2002; Walsh et al., 2002; Ariew
and Lewontin, 2004; Krimbas, 2004; Walsh, 2007; Ariew and
Ernst, 2009; Walsh, 2010).
While I lack the space to defend this claim in anything like
the detail it deserves, it seems to me plausible that the question
at work in the current debate is precisely that at issue between
Pearson and Weldon: how are our statistical theories to relate
to biological processes in the world? I do not mean to identify
either Pearson or Weldon’s views with either side in this debate,
and we of course see nothing like the sophistication of today’s
propensity interpretations of fitness, population genetics, and
so on in the 1890s. But this is certainly an interesting case –
we have an instance where it seems that a historical case can be
better understood by considering it in light of a contemporary
philosophical question than by the common ways in which it is
considered in the history of biology. That, I think, is a powerful
argument for the integration of the history and philosophy of
science.
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